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Abstract. Taking a quarter-century to build Europe’s internal market for electricity may seem an incredibly long 
journey. The aim of achieving a Europe-wide market might be reached, but it has involved – and continues to 
involve – a process subject to many adverse dynamics. The EU internal market may derail greatly in the coming 
years from the effects of a massive push for renewables, as well as a growing decentralization of the production-
consumption loop. Moreover, a serious concern is the risk of a definitive fragmentation of the European 
electricity market due to uncoordinated national policy initiatives with respect to, for example, renewable support 
and capacity payments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It took us a while to build an EU internal market for electricity. According to the Single European Act strategy 
of Commission President Jacques Delors, signed in 1986, it should have been implemented back in … 1992 – 
but that turned out to be only the first chapter of a 25-year, and still ongoing, process.  
The liberalization of the electricity sector started in the UK, followed by Norway, from the premise that 
while networks are natural monopolies that require regulatory control, generation and trade are potentially 
competitive activities. The reform of this sector was built on several pillars, including the unbundling of 
monopolistic activities, the introduction of competition in wholesale markets, the gradual extension of 
competition to the retail level, and incentive regulation à la RPI-X of network services. The European 
liberalization process had been set out to simultaneously target two goals: first, to achieve competitive prices 
through the game of market forces; second, to establish a unified energy market and thus contribute to the “ever 
closer Union” that will also be conducive to ensuring secure energy supplies.  
Much has been achieved since the early 1990s. Wholesale and retail markets are now open, and the 
eligibility of customers is mandatory in the EU, with a general increase in the choice of suppliers and tariffs and 
more competitive pricing [1]. Consumers can respond to price signals by changing their supplier or by adapting 
their consumption behavior. Innovative business models evolve in retail markets. Incentive regulation has 
brought the costs of grid operators down. Even though there are still significant differences among Member 
States in terms of electricity generation structure and concentration of generating companies and suppliers, in 
general, we no longer have a patchwork of closed national energy systems, each with a national-only company 
controlling the entire electricity sector [2]. However, certain anti-market arrangements, such as ill-designed 
regulated end-user prices or insufficient unbundling of distribution and retail activities, still prevail in many 
countries. 
EU officials claim that a first version of this European-wide power market should work by 2015
1
 – while 
we also know that this market is only going to implement the “old” goal of 1996; that is, of the first EU Internal 
Electricity Market Directive.
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 Thus, one may wonder whether this will be the end of the journey, or just a coffee 
break. The EU’s internal electricity market is already seriously challenged by two waves of disruptive 
innovations – the renewable energy sources and the smartening of the energy-system’s interactions. It is also 
challenged by exogenous shocks like the economic and financial crises, the Fukushima accident, or the flooding 
of cheap gas and cheap coal as a consequence of the US shale gas revolution. Accordingly, the goal of building 
a cohesive set of market arrangements in the EU cannot stop today or tomorrow, and we already know that what 
we need will be of a different nature than in the 1990s. This paper argues that existing regulation – once fully 
implemented – adds up to a “European market” even though many market arrangements differ from the perfect 
textbook case [3], [4]  (Section 2). However, since the initial power sector reform draft has neither been 
conceived for systems with a massive penetration of intermittent renewables, nor for a decentralization of the 
production–consumption loop, we need to revisit regulatory practices in the whole spectrum of market and 
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 network arrangements (Section 3). This obvious need to adapt market design and regulation to “unforeseen” 
developments, however, is not the only challenge. What is currently becoming a growing concern is the risk of a 
deep fragmentation of the European electricity market due to uncoordinated national policy initiatives in the 
areas of support of low-carbon generation technologies and possible capacity payments (Section 4). 
 
2. Europe’s Single Electricity Market: Done by 2015? 
 
Taking a quarter-century (from 1990 to 2015) to build Europe’s internal market for electricity may seem an 
incredibly long journey, as well as an example of the EU’s inability to accomplish serious industry reforms. But 
we should remember that no other “federal-style” government of a major country (such as the US, Canada, 
Brazil, Russia, India or China) has achieved an internal, continent-wide, open market for electricity so far.  
There are many good reasons why Europe has been so slow with the liberalization of its electricity sector, 
as discussed in-depth in [5]. This market project aimed to open up national monopolies’ territories to foreigners, 
which of course was a radical project that inevitably triggered huge and fierce opposition. Second, there was no 
wave of disruptive technological innovation – unlike in the case of telecoms – to challenge the incumbent 
energy giants. Third, electricity is a difficult product to trade, as it requires hundreds of technical, legal and 
economic rules and standards to be agreed upon before it can become tradable. Electricity is, after all, not more 
than a coordinated flow of electrons inside the millions of metallic wires of a gigantic, interconnected network. 
Therefore, for decades electricity was considered to be a typical “anti-market” product, best suited to natural or 
franchised monopolies. In fact, it has been the revolution in the information communications technology (ICT) 
sector that has enabled new market arrangements in the electricity industry. New ICT gave us the tools to 
register every move of electricity generators and consumers alike – thereby allowing one generator and one 
consumer to trade bilaterally in a market, in parallel to the electron flow variations. The fourth reason is that the 
various national arrangements that were historically developed between industry players and public authorities 
cannot be easily merged at the EU level into a common scheme of interoperable markets. 
Several successive packages have then been needed in order to get (almost) all EU countries to implement 
compatible market arrangements. These include the European Commission’s three energy packages (adopted in 
1996, 2003 and 2009, respectively), with the third
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 calling for the effective unbundling of generation and supply 
interests from the network, and increased transparency of retail markets. It also includes the establishment of the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) in order to ensure effective coordination among 
national regulatory authorities, and to make decisions on cross-border issues. Moreover, it incorporates the 
establishment of the European Network for Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E), which pushes all grid 
operators to cooperate and to develop common commercial and technical codes and security standards.  
In addition, a supplementary Infrastructure Package
4 
(adopted in 2013) defines rules to identify “projects of 
common interest” (PCIs); that is, infrastructure projects that will help Member States to physically integrate 
their energy markets and to enable the power grid to cope with increasing amounts of electricity generated from 
intermittent renewable energy sources within a number of key trans-European energy corridors and areas. 
The building blocks for the internal electricity market are laid out in the third energy package. If today we 
ask ourselves whether these existing arrangements – once fully implemented – add up to a “European market,” 
the answer is yes. Whereas in the old times, trade across borders of areas controlled by different transmission 
system operators (TSOs) was mostly guided by security, rather than economic considerations [6], today we have 
a set of national, day-ahead wholesale markets that are mostly connected by implicit access given to physical 
interconnections from the trade floor. Any bid accepted in an exchange is simultaneously taken into account by 
the other exchanges, and by the TSOs that manage the interconnections in between. Whenever there is 
significant congestion in the network, the European market splits into smaller regional or national markets until 
the congestion ends. Second, we have more and more intraday and “real-time” arrangements by which offers of 
capacity and energy services also cross the borders of electrical zones. Third, the network is itself becoming 
more and more Europeanized. New grid operation codes are being conceived at the EU level, and a common 
strategic planning of the EU grid is taking place under the “Ten Year Network Development Plans” adopted bi-
annually by ENTSO-E. The set of PCIs is also meant to better adapt our infrastructures to the internal market’s 
needs. 
Having said all this, it is nevertheless true that many anti-market arrangements still survive in too many 
European countries. At the wholesale level, byzantine market arrangements can add up to a “re-regulated access 
regime,” not only in France and Spain but also in the UK, in light of its new nuclear power program [7]. At the 
retail level, national governments have typically been reluctant to eliminate regulated end-user tariffs [8], [9], 
though these tariffs discourage consumers from searching for alternative suppliers and, even more 
consequentially, might prevent their exposure to more elaborate price signals. Unfair competition arises if these 
tariffs are not even aligned with wholesale prices, and instead establish values that are deliberately below the 
minimum levels needed to cover the cost of energy (plus the regulated charges, which also include network 
 tariffs, subsidies to renewables, or taxes). This may result in billions of euros of “tariff deficits,” as has notably 
been the case in Spain [10]. Moreover, insufficient unbundling of distribution companies can be a serious 
obstacle to competition [11], [12], provided that DSOs shall act as “entry gates to retail markets […] making 
them an important influence on the level of competition as well” [13]. 
The degree of market liberalization and competition still varies significantly across the EU, and there is 
broad consensus that there is “room for more competition in power markets” [14]. Energy markets in general are 
perceived not to be very transparent or sufficiently open for new entrants, including demand-side service 
providers [15], while prices have significantly converged due to market coupling. However, inter-regionally 
there remains significant scope for further market integration [1]. National distortions have significant effects, 
but they cannot entirely block the internal market’s functioning. Nevertheless, however imperfect the EU’s 
internal market may be, there can be no doubt that we are now very near to the European-wide market target set 
in 1986. 
 
3. Europe’s Single Electricity Market: Also Done Forever? 
 
It is far from guaranteed that this internal market for energy will work forever. The many national compromises 
that have been realigned and harmonized in successive EU compromises dealt with the past, and aimed to open 
up an EU market as conceived in the 1990s. However, many unforeseen but dramatic changes have happened 
during the past 20 years; these shifts from the initial power reform draft are not at the periphery of the system, 
but rather at its core. Their actual number is heavily debated. Let’s say five to seven. 
What we now live in in the EU does not fall under the former “common market – yes; common energy policy – 
never” motto that framed the European policy for 20 years from 1986. We now stand in a common energy 
policy frame designed at the EU level in 2007, when the European Council decided in Berlin to go for it. To this 
end, in 2009, a set of Directives, which are well-known today as the “20-20-20 climate and energy package,” 
was approved.
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 Parallel to this, a wave of “smart” innovations, such as advanced electricity meters, automation 
and remote-control technologies, et cetera, is growing. You might end up with an internal market headache: the 
energy policy frame did move, and key technologies are moving as well. 
 
2.1 Today’s Generation Mix Split into Two Contrasting Sets of Generators 
 
In the early 1990s, we were pretty sure that most of the “steam for markets for power” was there. At that time, 
generation did not seem like any type of natural monopoly, except in very rare cases where the size of the 
market was too small to duplicate the existing generation facility (pocket market). Free entry in generation, free 
choice of the fuel or primary resource, of the technology and of the plant size (if not the location) should act to 
break the old world of chartered territories for incumbent generation self-planning. This belief is heavily 
questioned today.  
Rising environmental concerns and associated market failures have led to a renewed public involvement in 
the power sector. Renewables are pushed in the electricity sector from outside the market. Both wind and solar 
PV energy run at the speed of their feed-in tariffs, or similar forms of deployment subsidies (see, e.g., [16], [17], 
[18]). Germany, for instance, is already deploying renewable generation to “a spectacular – and destabilizing – 
extent” [19]. The country doubled its renewable generation capacity within five years, increasing it from less 
than 40 GW in 2008, to more than 80 GW today. With virtually no barriers for entering the electrical system, 
renewables enjoy considerable advantages: they have always guaranteed access to existing consumption, 
whereas conventional thermal generation has only had access to the residual demand. In some EU countries, 
renewables also have the right to connect to the grid, and the grid owner has a duty to invest accordingly [20]. 
Over time, a significant proportion of Europe’s thermal power plants are selling less and less energy while 
providing more and more “flexible capacity” for the electrical system. Some countries, like the UK and France, 
are looking at bridging this power generation revenue gap by reorganizing their national market’s capacity 
arrangements. Obviously enough, this might well break up the EU’s internal market, as some thermal generators 
would still be paid only for the energy they can sell, while others would get both energy revenues and a national 
capacity payment.
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 A similar disruption might come from a national “energy price floor option” given to 
privileged generators (as new nuclear in the UK). Of course, and on the contrary, a harmonized enough frame 
for a long-term price guarantee might literally rejuvenate the wholesale power market.  
Even if capacity-splitting of the market did not occur, the present wholesale market might well undergo 
profound changes under the pressure of the growing share occupied by renewables. Large amounts of energy 
generated by renewables that enter the wholesale market greatly depress the market price. The variable cost of 
generating electricity with renewables is low, and a competitive energy market uses the variable cost of 
marginal power generation to price the market as a whole. That price can then easily drop close to zero if the 
 market is flooded by renewable energy. It can even fall below zero into negative prices, as has regularly been 
observed within, for example, the German market area [21]. Some thermal generators in such situations prefer to 
pay for the right to keep their plants running, as thermal plants may face difficulties when reducing their output 
(they have to contend with huge output start-up costs, and other dynamics).  
But in depressed conditions of this sort, how could the wholesale day-ahead market, which is the strongest 
backbone of the EU internal market, maintain its central position in the chain of electricity market arrangements 
that stretches from futures to real-time? The renewables, pushed by feed-in tariffs, largely locate their generation 
structure change in the realm of a public authority. The renewable priority of dispatch both reduces the market 
size remaining for non-renewable generators, and breaks the price trend at which they can make money or break 
even. Hence, the generation set is deeply fractured into two opposite sets of generators: on the one hand “new” 
generators that bear no significant risk for capacity, volume or price, thanks to, for instance, feed-in 
tariffs/premiums and priority dispatch, and on the other hand the “conventional” generators bearing a 
significantly increased uncertainty, and a foreseeable depressed future. 
  
2.2. Unpredictable Impacts of Technological Shocks on Available Set and Relative Cost of Generation 
Technologies 
 
The current EU Energy Roadmap scenarios [22] are built on a menu of essentially known technologies. They 
have also been criticized as relying on outdated cost assumptions for different low-carbon technologies [23]. Of 
course, 2050 is 37 years from now and, looking back 40 years ago, no oil crises had yet occurred, European 
energy markets had only national structures, and electricity generation from renewable sources was mainly 
restricted to some hydro power. In 2050, the energy system will probably be extremely different from what it is 
today. Composing an adequate portfolio of generation technologies encompasses a very long-term scope, which 
is not only about looking ahead towards the 2050 decarbonization horizon, but also anticipating technological 
lock-ins that might persist even beyond that point in time (see also [24]).  
On one hand, unforeseen technological shocks can eliminate technology options. For instance, a “2050 
bridging role” was given to nuclear energy in the first version of the German energy strategy in late 2010, 
whereas one year later the country announced a nuclear phase-out until 2022, as a response to the Fukushima 
accident.  
On the other hand, unforeseen technological revolutions can also add new or cheaper means of generation 
and decarbonization. For instance, whereas the International Energy Agency in its World Energy Outlook 2007 
(at the time when the 20-20-20 strategy was adopted by the European Council) predicted a moderate growth for 
US gas production, four years later the World Energy Outlook 2011 was centered around a possible “golden age 
of gas.” Assuming that the US will become a large-scale exporter of cheap gas, and that it is possible to replicate 
their experience in other parts of the world (from the UK to Poland or Ukraine; from India to China), the 
availability of cheap gas in the market would allow for a certain degree of decarbonization at low cost (or even 
net benefits – one should decarbonize to make more money in the market). The “rational” price of carbon might 
then fall extremely low under the push of shale gas as a market-based decarbonization technology. Hence, cheap 
gas may not only substitute dirty coal, but also expensive renewables.  
Certainly, technological developments, shocks and revolutions can have important, unpredictable impacts 
on the available set and relative cost of generation technologies.
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 How can innovation in the field of low-carbon 
technologies be sufficiently stimulated in a scenario involving decarbonization at a very low cost, and thus 
resulting in the lack of a strong carbon price signal? How will this interact with the market and network 
arrangements that we use in the EU as our common market model or network operation frame? 
 
2.3. Transition From “Centralized Top-Down” Towards “Distributed Local” Electricity Systems  
 
We observe changes in the generation mix, not only in the form of a shift from conventional fossil fuels towards 
renewables, but also in the form of a shift from centralized towards decentralized resources. More mature 
technologies for local renewable generation, decreased investment costs thereof, and ambitious national support 
schemes have led to the significant market penetration of distributed generation (DG) in many EU countries. An 
important share of renewable energy is no longer fed into the transmission grid, but at distribution grid level. In 
Germany, for instance, “in many places, the DG output of distribution networks already exceeds local load, 
sometimes by multiple times” [25].  
Furthermore, distributed storage might soon become viable at all voltage levels and in significant amounts, 
thereby becoming a critical component of the grid of the future [26], [27]. Likewise, the use of electric vehicles 
charging from local grids, and possibly also being able to inject power back into it, is expected to grow (see, 
e.g., [28], [29]). In addition, recent innovations in metering and communication devices enable active demand 
response and enhanced distribution automation. Whereas at the beginning of the liberalization process demand 
 response was considered only interesting for large, typically industrial, customers (Stephen Littlechild is one of 
the very few having always advocated for retail competition and demand response), technological advances 
today also make this concept appealing for residential consumers (see, e.g., [30], [31]).
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 Demand will become 
“as important as supply” [32]. Millions of smart consumers already are, or might soon be, producers of 
electricity themselves, thanks to solar PV panels. This is famously turning these consumers into “prosumers,” 
and it may therefore have a significant impact on both the offer and demand sides of these fast-changing 
segments of energy markets.  
This newly emerging broad range of “distributed energy resources” [33] – be it distributed generation, local 
storage, electric vehicles or demand response –also has the potential to drive significant changes in the planning 
and operation of the power systems. Traditional power systems were designed to transport electricity top-down, 
from generation connected to the transmission level to end consumers connected at distribution grids. Moreover, 
the distribution grid was designed accordingly, such that there were no significant bottlenecks or congestion. In 
contrast, today’s distribution systems are challenged by new features, such as increased volatility of net demand 
and peak demand fluctuations, as well as reverse flows from the distribution to the transmission grid in times of 
local generation exceeding local demand. It also increases the feasibility and the likelihood of having energy and 
power trades at the local level, du jamais vu. 
All these changes bring challenges for electricity distribution system operators (DSOs) and their regulation 
alike, ranging from increasing uncertainty in distribution grid flows to the necessary integration of new business 
models into retail markets. As we can already see, the distribution grids might become the new core of the EU 
internal market. The key question we should ask, from a market policy point of view, is how they will operate, 
and how they will be regulated and monitored? Should we avoid a situation in which several thousands of DSOs 
throughout Europe cause the fragmentation at a national and sub-national level of the existing EU internal 
market by spontaneously diverging through a myriad of different rules and arrangements? Nobody yet knows 
how the corresponding new services, whether communication-related or energy-related, as well as new markets 
that are immediately responsive to retail demand, will evolve. 
 
2.4. Network Neutrality  
 
Considering network neutrality as another important “unforeseen” shift from the initial power reform draft may 
be controversial, though it should not be, because it is actually a major departure. As natural monopolies, 
networks had to be detached from market operations, remaining neutral vis-à-vis the fuel mix, and cost-based 
with respect to hosting generation capacity. The main positive outcome expected from the networks in the 
liberalization process was a reduction of their costs to their bones, à la RPI-X formula [34]. However, 
transmission, as well as distribution, grids, are now seen as the vanguard of a significant shift of the whole 
industry towards new business models.  
 
2.4.1. Transmission Grid and TSO Regulation 
 
Challenges accompanying the connection and integration of large-scale renewable energy sources are manifold. 
First, we observe an increasingly unbalanced regional distribution of supply and demand. As a consequence, the 
transmission grid needs to be reinforced – within countries, but also via extended interconnection capacities – to 
be able to transport electricity from its sources to its sinks. Second, we expect an increasing share of remote 
generation, outside of the present European core grid. New lines need to be built to connect, for instance, 
offshore wind parks, or one day solar power plants in Northern Africa. Furthermore, the economic features of 
these new resources may presumably be different (different timing of investment and construction; and, 
technically, different load-following, production ramping and dispatch firmness profiles). The proper 
development and operation of networks, far from staying neutral, will strongly interact with the new users and 
new usages of transmission services. For the following three decades, the Commission estimates investments in 
transmission network infrastructures in the range of €100–200 billion [35].  
The Infrastructure Package could help to identify key infrastructure projects. A methodology for cost-
benefit analyses is currently developed in order to facilitate the selection of such PCIs (see also [36]). 
Nevertheless, serious challenges for investors, grid operators and regulators remain. Regulation affects firms’ 
investment behavior by altering the allocation of risk among shareholders and customers [37]. Whereas under 
traditional rate-of-return regulation much of the risk is shifted to the customers, and investments are thus 
encouraged, incentive regulation, in contrast, may discourage investments. Moreover, how to mobilize the 
required funding, given that, under the current evolution of transmission tariffs, only half of planned 
investments could be financed [38]?
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 How should grid costs be allocated, considering that the way we designed 
grid tariffs for our past priorities cannot stand forever, and that, instead, new grid tariffs have to be aligned with 
the new system needs (see also, e.g., [39], [40])?  
 
 2.4.2. Distribution Grid and DSO Regulation 
 
For high amounts of distributed energy resources (DER), the total costs of business-as-usual management of 
distribution networks is likely to increase in most systems. Substantial future investments are also required to 
properly connect all of these new DER to the distribution networks, to enable the system to deal with increased 
volatility of net demand and peak demand fluctuations, and to set up an ICT infrastructure that empowers DSOs 
to employ DER for their daily grid operations. DER offer a new set of instruments for grid operation, and 
thereby a tool for DSOs to perform their tasks of electricity distribution. DER also allow for an active 
distribution system management, and have the potential to decrease the total costs of DSOs compared to not 
relying on these new resources in local system management (see, e.g., [41], [42]). 
As discussed in-depth in [43] and [33], the use of DER in distribution grid management can decrease OPEX 
compared to a business-as-usual treatment of these resources. In contrast, how the use of DER will impact 
CAPEX is not obvious. Integrating DER into grid operation procedures can decrease CAPEX in the longer run, 
if grid investments can be deferred. For instance, relying on DER to solve local congestion can postpone 
investments in new lines (CAPEX hence being substituted for OPEX). On the other hand, in the short-run, 
significant expenditures for investments in grids and ICT infrastructures supporting grid monitoring and 
automation are needed upfront. New types of assets being part of a smart grid infrastructure will reflect in new 
types of CAPEX. A challenging task for regulators, therefore, remains to design a sound regulation that 
efficiently incentivizes DSOs to engage in active system management, and thus takes account of the changing 
OPEX and CAPEX structures, and of trade-offs among them. 
Finally, grid operators are much more than “simple regulated infrastructure monopolies” (like bridges or 
roads are), for which it might suffice that regulation primarily aims to decrease their costs. Instead, grid 
operators are becoming important market facilitators who shall favor all welfare-enhancing business models 
under any future market development. Both transmission and distribution grids are supposed to become smarter 
platforms for deeper market interactions. A regulatory challenge, therefore, lies in incentivizing grid operators to 
deploy innovative solutions and operating procedures. As discussed in [44], evidence suggests that past reforms 
in the power sector have led to a decline in R&D expenditures. Even if a certain part reflects inefficiency in 
expenditures before the reform process, short-term profitability may be further improved by reducing expenses 
in research and innovation. 
Regulators also realize that there is more to competition than setting price equal to cost [45], [46]. In this 
vein, grids may be remunerated for hosting more of the “socially preferred” generation mix, or even to start 
innovating and running pilots or demonstrations (such as offshore grids). At the end of the day, average grid 
costs will go up with increased investment costs. The low-cost, market distant and energy mix neutral grid 
revolution may fade away. 
 
2.5. Market Integrity  
 
A highly concentrated industry structure is detrimental to the development of a functioning and efficient internal 
energy market. Our initial wisdom was that a “good enough” generation structure is a necessary precondition to 
market opening: why bother to open markets that are structurally unable to be competitive? This was a key 
question in the UK in 1990, as it is in France today. Illiquid wholesale markets exposed to dominant market 
players might not only have negative consequences in terms of potential market power abuse (see, e.g., [47], 
[48]), but might also delay the transformation of balancing mechanisms into integrated balancing markets, or the 
development of further interconnection.  
However, improving the industry structure has been, and still is, one of the main difficulties in the 
construction of the internal energy market, as Member States are sovereign in defining their industrial structures 
[49]. The Commission has no right to intervene, except in cases of major mergers and acquisitions.  
Competition should be “at least workable”10 [50]. The consensus was a magic number of five or more 
competitors, none of whom has more than 20 percent market share. The Californian crisis with FERC blindly 
sticking to its Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index prejudice opened many eyes to other unacceptable 
deficiencies. [51] showed that more accurate definitions of market power, and more sophisticated econometrics, 
might be able to identify most of the “new industrial economics” ways in which market power is abused in 
power markets. In a similar vein, [32] underlined that regulators should stop focusing solely on outcomes, as, for 
instance, the market share of leading generation companies does not necessarily represent an appropriate 
measure of the degree of competition.  
However, many other doors remained open between market and manipulation. We did learn from the recent 
financial crisis, and also from the Californian electricity market crisis in the early 2000s, that market power is 
only one of the many determinants to be considered when attempting to make markets work. In addition, a lack 
of market transparency not only puts new entrants at a disadvantage, but can also have serious consequences on 
market functioning. Therefore, with the Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency, 
 (REMIT) the Commission aims to implement binding rules for transparency, and places ACER and national 
regulatory authorities in a market monitoring role. REMIT is still in its implementation phase. This new 
Regulation has to prove to be effective. The quality of data collection will be key to its success.  
So how to deal with thieves or criminals, like Enron and others in the financial markets (maybe Barclays or 
JP Morgan in the US) and how should they be deterred from destroying the market from the inside? If we 
cannot guarantee ex-ante transparency and integrity in power markets, how can we rely on these markets to 
bridge physically (unit commitment, dispatch, capacity allocation and congestion management) and financially 
(price arbitrage, portfolio and risk management, etc.)? Today we still know more about the “fire alarm” strategy 
of monitoring (how to assess, ex-post, the fairness of actual behaviors in existing markets) and less on the 
“police patrol” strategy (how to prevent, ex-ante, manipulations or crimes). An obvious link between ex-ante 
and ex-post strategies is how we conceive the definition and the collection of data, the architecture and 
languages of databases, as well as the screening tools, the market models and the software. Moreover, we have a 
considerable knowledge about a “country market” monitoring, but have we achieved enough across borders and 
across markets? Finally, another key issue is how to manage the loop between market monitoring, market 
investigation and market fixing. 
  
2.6. Market Design  
 
Market players cannot entirely design power markets by themselves, because power markets are structurally 
incomplete [52], [53]. We saw that market players can easily trade energy until “market gate closure,” but they 
cannot easily trade the corresponding transmission capacity and reserve the availability needed to implement 
this “ex-ante” energy trade. To alleviate these market difficulties, power markets play the wholesale trade 
through a series of steps, which mimic the simple offer and demand arrangement of a textbook market situation. 
Power markets are actually “sequences of markets” from the pre-commitment of plants, day(s) ahead of the real-
time balancing of actual injections and withdrawals, via the allocation of transmission capacity and the 
necessary management of seen and unforeseen congestions.  
Making electricity marketable actually means completing the textbook market case with more central 
coordination, more third party intervention, and market intermediation (see also [54]). If one wants to make 
electricity homogenous, good, and easier to contract and to trade, at some point the growing gap between the 
actual physical flows and the notional traded good must be dealt with. The very nature and the right amount of 
“third party” coordination in power markets is still under discussion after 20 years. We not only disagree on how 
to design complements or auxiliaries to the market, but also on what to keep free for trade.  
We did not really foresee how deeply market trade and market interactions will depend on the market 
arrangements agreed by policy makers here and there. Even if we bypass more than a decade of wholesale 
storyboard (see also, e.g., [55], [56], [57]) – such as the UK Pool and New Trading Arrangement, Nord Pool, 
Germany’s dual competing power exchanges, etc. – today we are still discovering how to connect the existing 
market areas across the existing electrical control zones. Should we “couple” the existing markets within a 
harmonized nodal frame? Or only with an explicit (or implicit) transmission capacity auctioning? Should we 
focus only on a day-ahead horizon? Should it then be “flow-based,” or with rigid, predetermined, “net transfer 
capacity”? Should we also couple for intra-day trade? With a few successive windows of price fixing? Or with 
continuous trading? Should we extend to pooling adjacent markets on their balancing horizon? Through a 
“loose” common pool of offers from which several system operators may pick up for their needs? Or through a 
“tight” cross-border common management of all balancing options? Why not then a loose system operator 
auxiliary (like CORESO), or a more substantial, light, European ISO? 
Much effort has been (and still is) made at the European level to develop common rules for grid operation.
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However, these “Network Codes” are not conceived to develop a deep cooperation among TSOs, as there is a 
requirement, for instance, to tackle congestion and stability at regional levels, such as in the cases of US 
Regional Transmission Organizations and RTOs. Even scenarios of grid operation are looked at only in a 
voluntary frame (like CORESO). In practice, it has proven extremely difficult to ensure an effective 
development of regional grids, and one may doubt whether the Infrastructure Package will be able to tackle this. 
Another major flaw of these Network Codes is that they have been conceived for a system with a generation 
fleet connected to the transmission grid. But what we see today is an increasing penetration of generation, and 
other local energy resources such as demand response or energy storage capacities, connected to the distribution 
grid. 
Moreover, the European grid frame avoids nodal pricing and financial transmission rights. However, if we 
wanted to have these two as new operation principles, they would have to be introduced at the European level, 
otherwise they would lose a significant part of their effectiveness. 
 
 4. Conclusions 
 
Building a European internal market for electricity has been a slow process for 25 years, but it is now close to 
being achieved. We Europeans conceived our internal market arrangements “our way,” even though many other 
ways were, or still are, foreseeable. Europe could for example, have opened up the wholesale market without 
opening the retail market, or could have made opening the wholesale market mandatory, with a centralized 
exchange system operating a single price algorithm, just as England and Wales did for more than 10 years. 
In the end, building this internal market has been – and should continue to be – a process that is subject to 
several dynamics. What we now call the EU internal market is in many elements a compromise among all the 
other national-level compromises. It is far from being a perfect mechanism capable of serving us with 
everything, regardless of the prevailing conditions. This emerging EU market may suffer greatly in the coming 
years from a massive increase in renewable energies, or from a deep decentralization of the production-
consumption loop. The future, as is already debated in a post-2020 strategy, is far from clear. However, what is 
clear is that the introduction of new ICT-based technologies could radically modify the economic and physical 
functioning of the electricity system, and as a result the functioning of the market. What is therefore urgently 
needed now is “a realistic design for the transition process from today’s low-ICT, high-carbon energy system to 
a high-ICT, low-carbon system of tomorrow” [58]. It would be irresponsible not to ask for renewed regulatory 
oversight. 
What are the main obstacles to be overcome for 2015, 2020, … or even 2030? This is a big agenda in 
research, and is still open. An ideal power market architecture would build on nodal pricing, financial 
transmission rights, and long-term energy price guarantees. But we are unable to get it at the moment. In 
addition, it is also far from clear how one could achieve the required cooperation among Member States. 
The need to adapt market design and network regulation to “unforeseen” developments is not the only 
challenge. What is currently becoming a serious concern is the risk of a re-fragmentation of the European 
electricity market due to uncoordinated national initiatives. It is true that national diversity has first and foremost 
been a predictable result of the nature of the compromises made when scoping the first electricity directive. The 
2nd and 3rd Packages successfully managed to reduce the scope of this diversity; however, we observe now an 
again increasing impact of national interventions. 
First, diverse renewable support schemes have resulted in a patchwork of effective, but market-distorting, 
subsidies (see, e.g., [17], [59]). With the exception of a joint support scheme in Norway and Sweden, no use has 
been made so far of cooperation mechanisms. In contrast, national support, often together with rules on priority 
grid access and dispatch, was introduced on the grounds of incomplete market opening, an incomplete 
internalization of the externalities of conventional generation, and immature renewable-energy technologies 
[14]. However, markets and technologies have evolved since then, and support mechanisms need to be reviewed 
urgently (see also [60]).  
Second, a number of Member States have introduced, or plan to introduce, separate payments for the 
market availability of generation capacity. In Germany, for instance, it is justified by the high share of 
intermittent generation, blowing conventional generation out of the market, and therefore out of money, whereas 
the UK wants to react to a shortage in overall capacity due to the shutdown of several dirty power plants. 
As correctly stressed by the Commission, any public intervention being ill-designed, and lacking a proper 
coordination at the European level, risks being counterproductive, and can distort the functioning of the internal 
electricity market [14]. The creation of an EU-wide market has made national markets more interdependent. On 
one hand, market opening enables the exploitation of synergies and economies of scale; on the other, any public 
intervention affects prices, and not only domestically. In this vein, national capacity payments can interfere with 
cross-border trade and competition, as they can close off domestic markets from generation elsewhere in the 
EU. They also can distort decisions on the location of new generation units and, hence, increase total costs by 
preventing an optimal use of generation and flexibility across borders. 
To conclude, public interventions should not only be properly coordinated within Member States, but also 
between them in order to minimize costs for consumers and tax payers, and avoid any distortions in competition. 
Certain situations might call for national solutions; for other situations, the solution might be found in a broader 
regional, or even EU-wide, context. Two principles are to be respected. First, public intervention must not go 
beyond what is necessary to respond to existing market failures (proportionality principle). Second, any EU 
involvement must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the high-level objectives in the EU treaties, 
except for areas of EU-exclusive competences. EU action should only be taken when it is more effective than 
actions at a national, regional, or local level (subsidiarity principle).  
We know that the Commission will use its powers for policing state aids (as recently happened in 
Germany), and, for instance, for approving national capacity mechanisms, only if the respective Member State 
devotes funds to improving its interconnections with neighbors [18]. However, this does not reveal whether 
European competition policy will be the tool that is able to seal the many wounds of EU market arrangements. 
 Our electricity markets and networks are at the gate of a sea of perils; there is no guarantee that they will sail till 
the next safe harbor. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. On 4 February, 2011, the European Council set 2014 as a target year for the completion of the internal market for electricity and gas.  
2. Directive 96/92/EC “concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity.” 
3. Directive 2009/72/EC, “concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity;” Regulation 714/2009, “on conditions for 
access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity;” and Regulation 713/2009, “establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators.”  
4. Regulation 347/2013, “on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure.” 
5. In order to achieve the “20-20-20 objectives” (that is, a 20 percent reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels; a 20 
percent increase in the share of EU energy consumption produced from renewable resources; and at least a 20 percent reduction of EU 
primary energy use compared with projected levels – all by 2020), this package included a strengthening of existing policy tools, as well as 
the implementation of new instruments. It mainly stands on three pillars: (a) a revision and strengthening of the EU emissions trading 
system (Directive 2009/29/EC); (b) an Effort Sharing Agreement governing GHG emissions from sectors not covered by the EU ETS 
(Decision 406/2009/EC); and (c) binding national targets for renewable energy (Directive 2009/28/EC). 
6. See [61] and [62], and references therein, for an elaborate overview of market imperfections that may result in a “missing money” 
situation, as well as in alternative capacity-mechanism designs. 
7. Possible technology paths towards a 2050 (decarbonized) electricity system are also outlined in (for example) [63], [64], [65], [66].  
8. Given a positive cost-benefit analysis, at least 80 percent of European households are intended to be equipped with intelligent 
metering systems by 2020 [67]. 
9. An interesting proposal is the German Bürgerdividende: citizens directly affected by the expansion of the electricity grid will have 
the opportunity to take a stake in these new assets, with a guaranteed return on investment of up to 5 percent.  
10. [50] refers to a market that is “perhaps less perfect than the textbook vision of a competitive market but yet generally free from 
monopolistic pricing and various forms of collusion and manipulation.” 
11. The Commission aims to support well-functioning, cross-border wholesale markets. Regarding “capacity allocation and congestion 
management,” requirements for TSOs and power exchanges will be formulated on how to operate the integrated electricity market in the 
long-term, day-ahead and intraday timeframes by defining rules for, for instance, capacity calculation, bidding zone configuration and 
capacity allocation. The objectives of other network codes relate to a harmonized system operation regime, including security, control and 
quality, or the integration of national balancing markets. 
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